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I. INTRODUCTION
Early this May, law student Cody Wilson fired by hand the world’s first
fully printed three-dimensional (3-d) plastic gun.1 This novel weapon,
deemed “The Liberator,” represents the dawn of a new industrial revolution
– a technology enabling the average consumer to instantaneously create
new or existing products in real time from the comfort of one’s own home.2
3-d printing carries the potential for improvements and innovation, such as
the ability to cut waste and increase the number of products available to
consumers; however, criminals will also undoubtedly begin to discover
their own capabilities.3 While 3-d printers are not yet fixtures in the typical
household, they will become increasingly available and affordable to the
general public as the technology improves.4
As 3-d printers become more obtainable, the printable and undetectable
1. See generally Andy Greenberg, Meet the ‘Liberator’: Test-Firing the World’s
First Fully 3D-Printed Gun, FORBES
(May 5, 2013, 5:30 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/05/05/meet- the-liberator-test-firingthe-worlds-first-fully-3d-printed-gun/ [hereinafter Greenberg, Meet the ‘Liberator’]
(describing the 3- d printed gun’s first successful shot).
2. See Mitch Free, 3D-Printed Gun Fires a New Shot Heard ‘Round the World’,
FORBES (May 12, 2013, 3:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mitchfree/2013
/05/12/3d-printed- gun-fires-a-new-shot-heard-round-the-world/ [hereinafter Free,
Round the World] (noting the changes in product manufacturing).
3. See Dennis Draeger, Future Tech: How 3D Printing will Change the World,
ALTERNET (May 9, 2012), http://www.alternet.org/story/ 155254/future
_tech%3A_how_3d_printing_will_change_the_world [hereinafter Draeger, Future
Tech] (explaining that the future of 3-d printing includes the good, the bad, and the
grotesque).
4. See Christopher J. Ferguson, 3-D Printed Guns are a Boon for Criminals, CNN
(May 7, 2013, 7:28 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/ 05/07/opinion/ferguson-printablegun [hereinafter Ferguson, Boon for Criminals] (recognizing that 3-d gun models will
improve).
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gun will likely become the “realm of the criminal.”5 Further, the 3-d
printed gun will render today’s gun laws ineffective as it will become
nearly impossible to keep these weapons out of a criminal’s reach, an
inevitable consequence of posting 3-d gun blueprints on the Internet for
anyone to download.6 These types of concerns prompted the State
Department to send Mr. Wilson a letter demanding that he remove
computer files containing the plastic gun’s blueprint from the Internet.7
The State Department’s letter sparked First Amendment concerns over
whether the government can prevent citizens from publishing these types of
computer files, focusing on reaching the proper balance between national
security and citizens’ First Amendment rights.8
This Comment argues that the regulation of 3-d gun blueprints on the
Internet serves a government interest in harm regulation that justifies
limitations on First Amendment freedoms.9 Part II discusses 3-d printing
and the absence of specific laws designed to focus on the implications of
modern technology, such as 3-d printing.10 Part II also summarizes the
basic principles and tenets of the First Amendment and the case law that
shapes a First Amendment analysis of 3-d gun regulations.11 Part III argues
that, under a First Amendment analysis, computer files containing the 3-d
gun blueprint should be classified as both expressive and functional.12 Part
III also argues that controlling the dissemination of 3-d gun blueprint files
on the Internet serves an important government interest and, therefore,

5. See id. (arguing that while law-abiding citizens should enjoy the right to own
weapons, access should be limited for some).
6. See id. (quoting Senator Chuck Schumer, who argues that the 3-d printable gun
allows anyone to create an undetectable firearm).
7. See Todd Sperry, U.S. Requires Group to Remove 3-D Gun Instructions from
its Website, CNN (May 13, 2013, 10:51 AM) http://cnn.com/2013/05/09/politics/3-dguns (explaining that the State Department believes this is a national security issue).
8. See Devin Long, Censoring Firearms: Gun Laws and Censorship Clashing in
the World of 3-d Printing, OASIS OF THOUGHT (June 7, 2013),
http://devinlong.wordpress.com/2013/06/07/censoringfirearms-gun-laws-andcensorship-clashing-in-the-world-of-3-d- printing/ (questioning the government’s
ability to censor these files).
9. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (holding that
limitations on First Amendment freedoms may be justified).
10. See infra Part II (explaining how 3-d printing works, the creation of the 3-d
gun, and its applicable legal framework).
11. See infra Part II (analyzing how a speech’s classification affects possible
restraints under the First Amendment).
12. See infra Part III (arguing that these computer files deserve a unique analysis
under the First Amendment because of their expressive and functional aspects).
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limitations on First Amendment freedoms are reasonable and justified.13
Part IV moves beyond the First Amendment and argues that there is a
pressing public policy need to reach a consensus on the best way to regulate
3-d gun blueprints before this new technology outpaces the law.14 Finally,
Part V concludes by reiterating that limiting the publication of 3-d gun
blueprints on the Internet is justified under the First Amendment, regardless
of whether regulation is called for because of export control violations or
for other reasons, because the restriction serves an important government
interest.15
II. BACKGROUND
A. What is 3-d Printing?
3-d printers produce three-dimensional objects from a digital file through
a technique called additive manufacturing.16 Computer Aided Design
(CAD) software creates digital 3-d models, outlining the dimensions and
details of a desired object.17 The software breaks up the model into thin,
0.1 mm tall horizontal cross-sections, directing the printer to lay down
molecules layer by layer.18 Through this process of additive manufacturing,
materials are joined together to make objects that, when complete, resemble
the digital model.19
Compared to more conventional manufacturing processes, 3-d printers
and the software they utilize are more accessible and easier to use.20 In
13. See infra Part III (asserting that the restraint serves important interests in
national security and harm prevention).
14. See infra Part IV (noting that the regulation of 3-d printing must be tackled at
the forefront).
15. See infra Part V (recognizing the continuing need to analyze new technology
for potential First Amendment restraints).
16. See Draeger, Future Tech, supra note 3 (explaining that additive
manufacturing builds products from the bottom up, by adding resources, instead of
through a more conventional process known as subtractive manufacturing where
materials are removed).
17. See id. (asserting that a CAD file contains a blueprint and communicates to a
3-d printer how to build an object).
18. See Peter Jensen-Haxel, Comment, 3D Printers, Obsolete Firearm Supply
Controls, and the Right to Build Self-Defense Weapons Under Heller, 42 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REV. 447, 450 (2012) [hereinafter Jensen-Haxel, 3D Printers] (noting that
layers fuse with the layers below).
19. See Terry Wohlers, Additive Manufacturing 101: Part I, MTADDITIVE (Jan.
11 2010), available at http://www.mtadditive.com/ articles/additive-manufacturing101-part-i (stating that some additive manufacturing systems produce parts in
thermoplastics, a plastic that melts into molten liquid at high temperatures).
20. See Jensen-Haxel, supra note 18, at 452 (explaining that users can create their
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fact, 3-d printers have already successfully printed a multitude of products
using a variety of plastics and metals.21 Now, a functional gun stands
amongst these products.22
B. 3-d Printing, 3-d Guns, and the Current Legal Framework
Although 3-d printing already has created an impressive array of
products, unexpected dangers resulting from this far-reaching technology
will also undoubtedly present challenges.23 Several of these challenges will
stem from the lack of a substantive legislative framework that deals with
these emerging issues.24 Indeed, many of these issues may fit within the
contours of pre-existing laws, particularly encompassing areas of the law
focused on gun control and information censorship.25
However,
technological advancements will inevitably continue to pose novel and
challenging questions.26 For example, the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) ostensibly pertains to 3-d gun printing because this set
of government regulations controls the export and import of defense-related
articles and information in the interest of national security.27 Accordingly,
the State Department ordered Mr. Wilson to remove files containing the 3-d
gun’s blueprints from his website in order to determine whether Mr.
Wilson violated ITAR by posting files on the Internet, which allowed users
worldwide to download and print functional firearms with the help of a 3-d
printer.28
own designs or download free models online).
21. See id. at 451 (listing examples of 3-d printed products from edible chocolate
sculptures to aerospace parts).
22. See Free, Round the World, supra note 2 (discussing how the 3-d printed gun
successfully fired a bullet at lethal velocity).
23. See Jamie Chandler, How to Regulate 3-D Printed Guns, U.S. NEWS (May 11,
2013),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/jamie-chandler/2013/05/11/how-toregulate-3-d-guns [hereinafter Chandler, How to Regulate] (recognizing unforeseen
dangers).
24. See id. (arguing that currently only vague laws exist that do not focus on the
more complex problems of modern technology).
25. See Farhad Manjoo, Don’t Fear the 3-D Gun, SLATE MAGAZINE (May 8, 2013,
5:30
AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/
technology/2013/05/_3_d_printed_gun_yes_it_will_be_possible_to_m
ake_weapons_with_3_d_printers.html (suggesting that information control around 3-d
printed guns is not beyond the government).
26. See Greenberg, Meet the ‘Liberator,’ supra note 1 (commenting that the 3-d
gun blurs the line between firearm regulation and information censorship).
27. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (2012) (regulating technical information required for
the design or manufacture of defense articles, including information in the form of
blueprints).
28. See Letter from Glenn E. Smith, Chief of the Enforcement Div. of the U.S.
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The State Department’s action shifts the gun control debate into a new
legal arena, focusing on the First Amendment rather than the Second
Amendment.29 Specifically, it raises the issue of whether the State
Department’s letter demanding that Mr. Wilson and his non-profit group,
Defense Distributed, remove the CAD files from the Internet violated Mr.
Wilson’s right to freedom of expression under the First Amendment.30 In
turn, the issue of whether the letter violates the First Amendment depends
on whether the First Amendment right to speech includes posting CAD
files on the Internet, and, if so, the scope of First Amendment protection
that the files should receive.31
C. Basic Principles and Tenants of the First Amendment
1. Overview of the First Amendment and Scope of First Amendment
Protection
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides strong
protections for citizens’ freedom of speech, specifically protecting the right
to freedom of expression from government interference.32 Although the
First Amendment literally applies only to speech, the Supreme Court
recognizes that its protection extends beyond pure speech, an area
traditionally encompassing only the spoken and written word.33
Nevertheless, pure speech enjoys the highest degree of First Amendment
protection, unless it falls under one of the judicially-recognized
exceptions.34

Dep’t of State, to Mr. Wilson, Defense Distributed (May 8, 2013), available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/
andygreenberg/2013/05/09/state-department-demandstakedown-of- 3d-printable-gun-for-possible-export-control-violation/ [hereinafter U.S.
Dep’t of State, Letter] (stating that Mr. Wilson likely did not get the proper approval to
post the file online).
29. See Ferguson, Boon for Criminals, supra note 4 (presenting legal issues that 3d guns pose, including whether a restriction on a 3-d gun blueprint is a restriction on
guns or information).
30. See U.S.CONST. amend. I (guaranteeing the right to free speech).
31. See Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001)
(analyzing a series of preliminary issues to the First Amendment challenge, including
whether computer code is speech and its appropriate level of protection).
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (guaranteeing five freedoms: speech, press, religion,
assembly, and petition).
33. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (acknowledging conduct
with sufficient elements of communication as speech).
34. See United States v. Stevens, 599 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (identifying categories
of speech outside the First Amendment’s protection where social interest and morality
outweigh the expressive interests, such as child pornography).
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The category of pure speech has expanded so that now purely
expressive activities, in addition to the spoken and written word, can
qualify as pure speech.35 Therefore, expressive activities also enjoy full
First Amendment protection, meaning that regulations on protected speech
are constitutional only if they regulate time, place, or manner and not
content.36 Reasonable restrictions on time, place, or manner are justified
provided that they are content-neutral interests that are narrowly tailored to
achieve a significant government interest.37
Conduct that expresses an idea (“expressive conduct”)
combines speech and non-speech elements.38 Since expressive conduct has
non-speech elements, it must be “sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication” to fall within the First Amendment’s scope.39 Regulations
on conduct that satisfy this standard are subject to a less stringent standard
of review than that for restrictions on pure speech.40 Specifically, if
conduct contains sufficient elements of communication, restrictions or
regulations are justified if: (1) it is within the constitutional powers of the
government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial government interest;
(3) the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech; and (4) the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than needed to further the interest.41 However, if the conduct does not
sufficiently demonstrate elements of communication to bring the First
Amendment into play, the government has even more freedom to regulate
as the regulation must only rationally relate to a legitimate governmental
35. See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that tattooing is fully protected by the First Amendment because it is a purely
expressive activity).
36. See id. at 1058 (concluding that because tattooing is pure expression,
regulation must pose a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction to survive
constitutional scrutiny).
37. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (noting that the
narrowly tailored test is met if the interest would be achieved less effectively without
the regulation).
38. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (acknowledging that
speech elements may exist in conduct even if ideas are not expressed through printed or
spoken words).
39. See id. (articulating the “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication”
standard to determine whether an activity merits First Amendment analysis).
40. See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1058 (explaining that the government has less
freedom in restricting written or spoken words because courts employ a different level
of judicial scrutiny).
41. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (outlining the four-part
test for analyzing the regulation of a conduct that combines non-speech and speech
elements).
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interest.42
Therefore, under this complex legal framework, CAD files must first
classify as speech to bring them within the scope of the First Amendment.43
If deemed speech, how the speech is characterized will ultimately decide
the level of scrutiny courts will apply when analyzing laws that restrict the
use of a CAD file.44 Specifically, if a CAD file is pure speech, restrictions
will be subject to a higher degree of scrutiny and the speech will generally
enjoy full First Amendment protections.45
If a CAD file combines speech and non-speech elements yet still
contains sufficient elements of communication, then the restriction can only
survive intermediate scrutiny if it furthers a substantial government interest
unrelated to the suppression of free speech.46 Finally, if a CAD file does
not sufficiently contain elements of communication to bring it within the
First Amendment’s protection then regulation will be subject to the lowest
level of scrutiny where the regulation need only rationally relate to a
legitimate government interest.47 Although courts have carved out this
framework for First Amendment analysis, CAD files and other modern
technologies pose new questions, particularly focusing on whether their
new functional capabilities replace elements of communication
traditionally required to bring the First Amendment into play.48
2. How Courts Classify Speech for First Amendment
Purposes
a. Expressive Activity
Expressive activities or conduct generally represent information and

42. See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1058 (explaining that the district court erroneously
employed the rational basis test based on its incorrect conclusion that tattooing lacked
sufficient elements of communication to receive First Amendment protection).
43. See id. (determining first what type of speech tattooing is).
44. See id. (distinguishing different types of speech and their appropriate levels of
scrutiny).
45. See id. (asserting that the First Amendment clearly applies to pure speech and
affords it the highest protection).
46. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (outlining the four-part test to use when
analyzing conduct combining speech and non-speech).
47. See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1058 (explaining that if the speech does not
implicate the First Amendment, courts may apply the rational basis test).
48. See Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001)
(asserting in its constitutional inquiry that communication does not lose its
constitutional protection as speech merely because of its computer code language and
the presence of functional, non-speech elements).
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communicate ideas.49 Whereas courts classify written and spoken words as
pure speech, expressive activities move beyond this pure speech
categorization because they combine elements of both speech and
conduct.50 Further, the First Amendment does not require the articulation
of a narrow and isolated message to classify expressive activities as speech,
but instead it defines this type of speech by its general ability to convey
ideas and information.51 However, the First Amendment in no way offers
absolute protection for all forms of expressive speech; rather, courts agree
that the government generally has more leeway in restricting expressive
conduct than it does in restricting pure speech.52
In fact, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that conduct
intending to express an idea cannot conclusively be labeled as speech
without first considering its context and the government’s interest.53 Thus,
in O’Brien, the Supreme Court found that although a communicative
element may exist in the burning of a Selective Service registration
certificate, it does not imply that the activity is therefore constitutionally
protected.54 Specifically, when a process does not produce pure expression
and on its face does not necessarily convey a message, such as wearing a
black armband or burning a draft card, courts must determine whether the
activity is sufficiently imbued with communicative elements before
beginning a First Amendment analysis.55
In Spence, the Supreme Court engaged in this exact type of analysis
when determining whether displaying a flag upside-down with a peace
49. See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that the
encryption source code qualifies as speech because of its ability to convey information
and ideas).
50. See Commonwealth v. Oakes, 551 N.E.2d 910, 912 (Mass. 1990) (classifying
the semi-nude photographing of minor as expressive because the photographing and
photos mixed speech and conduct).
51. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Grp. Of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995)
(concluding that a parade is a form of expression because it makes a collective point in
the same way that saluting a flag or wearing an armband to protect a war does).
52. See Oakes, 551 N.E.2d at 912 (acknowledging that the Government has less
power to regulate written or spoken word); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 55-61 (1983) (explaining that courts will employ
different levels of scrutiny in public and non-public forums).
53. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (refusing to define
speech, as applied in the First Amendment, as any conduct intending to express an
idea).
54. See id. at 376 (finding that Congress has a substantial interest in preventing the
destruction of these certificates).
55. See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1501, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010)
(asserting that some types of activities may be done for reasons having nothing to do
with expression)
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symbol on it qualified as First Amendment protected speech.56 After
considering the appellant’s overall purpose in protesting the then-recent
actions in Cambodia and fatal events at Kent State University, the Supreme
Court held that the appellant’s display of the flag qualified as a form of
protected expression because it contained sufficient elements of
communication.57 Further, even if communicative elements sufficiently
exist to bring the First Amendment into play, conduct or speech may still
be limited if, for example, the regulation is content-neutral and furthers a
substantial governmental interest.58 Thus, the Supreme Court has explicitly
tolerated incidental limitations on the First Amendment for expressive
activities in cases where the regulation survives intermediate scrutiny.59
b. Functional Activity
Wholly functional activities do not communicate an idea or message as
expressive activities do, but exist solely for their functional purpose;
therefore, the First Amendment does not apply.60 For example, in Tenafly,
the Court found that an eruv, or an area designed to allow Orthodox Jews to
engage in outdoor activities during the Sabbath, did not send a discernible
message, but rather stood for its purely functional purpose, similar to a
Sufficient elements of
fence’s purpose in enclosing a yard.61
communication did not exist in the eruv and thus, it did not warrant First
Amendment protection.62
Likewise, courts have recognized the functionality of modern
technology, such as the Internet’s domain name system.63 In Name.Space,
56. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 405-06 (1974) (analyzing whether
the Washington statute, under which the appellant was charged, contravened the First
Amendment).
57. See id. at 408 (noting the appellant’s stated purpose of trying to associate the
American flag with peace instead of war when considering whether sufficient elements
of communication existed to bring the First Amendment into play).
58. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (holding that sufficient governmental interest
justified the conviction for burning Selective Service registration certificates).
59. See id. (explaining that a limitation on the First Amendment is just if it furthers
an important interest unrelated to free expression that is no greater than necessary).
60. See Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 164 (3d Cir.
2002) (arguing that an eruv was neither designed to nor does communicate an idea or
message).
61. See id. (describing the functional purpose of the eruv while recognizing its lack
of communicative elements).
62. See id. at 162, 164 (noting that an eruv is not so intertwined with speech
because it is a boundary, not a symbol).
63. See Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 577 (2d Cir.
2000) (explaining the structure of domain names, focusing on the Top Level Domain
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the court again recognized only the functional feature of gTLDs for their
ability to direct traffic through the Internet, finding that the First
Amendment did not apply because the three-letter gTLDs lacked
expressive content.64 However, functional work may still warrant First
Amendment protection if, for example, it has both functional and
expressive features.65 Nonetheless, when a medium combines speech and
non-speech elements, a regulation that targets only the functional aspects,
rather than the expressive aspects, will likely withstand a First Amendment
challenge.66
c. Potential for Both an Expressive and Functional Classification
Expressive speech containing functional elements may still qualify as
pure speech.67 For example, the Ninth Circuit held that speech deserves the
same protection afforded to pure speech when a speech’s functionality is so
intertwined with the purely expressive end-product.68 However, courts also
recognize processes as expressive conduct distinct from their resulting pure
speech end-products.69 Specifically, the court in Oakes distinguished
between the actual production of pornographic material and the ultimate
dissemination of the photographs when considering the defendant’s
argument that the posing and photographing of a nude minor should qualify
as pure speech.70
Courts have also recognized activities with both seemingly expressive
(TLD) comprised of two groups: seven generic TLDs (gTLDs) e.g. “.com,” and about
250 two-letter country code TLDs (ccTLDs) e.g. “.us”).
64. See id. at 585 (arguing that the district court correctly held that the existing
gTLDs did not constitute protected speech while noting that the court did not address
the possibility of more expressive gTLDs, such as “.jones_for_president”).
65. See Robert Plotkin, Comment, Fighting Keywords: Translating the First
Amendment to Protect Software Speech, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 329, 340-41
(2003) (asserting that functionality does not necessarily preclude First Amendment
protection).
66. See Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 442 (2d Cir. 2001)
(finding the injunction on the program survived intermediate scrutiny because it
targeted its functionality).
67. See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.2d 1051, 1068(9th Cir. 2010)
(recognizing the process of tattooing and the tattoo as pure speech despite the process’s
functionality).
68. See id. at 1062 (explaining that the tattooing process directly relates to the
tattoo and that because both are expressive, the entire process qualifies as pure speech).
69. See Commonwealth v. Oakes, 551 N.E.2d 910, 912 (Mass. 1990) (rejecting the
defendant’s argument that the posing and photographing of a nude minor constituted
pure speech).
70. See id. at 913 (comparing the defendant’s expressive conduct to the
dissemination of photographs, which would be pure speech).
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and functional elements as speech when analyzing computer code.71 First,
computer code, although expressed in a less familiar language, may still
qualify as expressive speech because of its ability to communicate
information.72 Second, computer code performs functional activities
because it essentially instructs computers to execute a task or series of
tasks.73 This trait merely distinguishes code from other protected forms of
First Amendment speech, but does not exclude it from the category of
speech meriting potential First Amendment protection.74
In Corley, the court explained that computer code exhibits both
expressive characteristics because it qualifies as a type of program
language as well as functional characteristics because a code, when
executed by a computer, carries out functions and performs tasks.75 As a
result, although computer code has this distinguishing functional trait, the
court acknowledged that this functionality does not necessarily preclude it
from conveying information, which is characteristic of expressive
Accordingly, computer code and computer programs
activity.76
constructed from code may too warrant First Amendment protection if
sufficient elements of communication exist.77
3. Balancing Test
Although the Supreme Court has tolerated incidental limitations on
speech or expression protected under the First Amendment, the government
bears a heavy burden of showing justification for prohibiting speech or
expression before it actually takes place; this is commonly referred to as
“prior restraint.”78 Thus, in cases involving prior restraint, the analysis
71. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 445-46 (conceding that communication does not lose
constitutional protection as speech simply because it is expressed as code and
explaining the need to tailor familiar constitutional rules to novel circumstances).
72. See id. (reasoning that the symbolic notations in math formulas and musical
scores communicate to specific audiences).
73. See id. at 446 (observing that code may give instructions, such as to perform a
task when initiated by a click of a mouse).
74. See id. at 447 (analogizing computer code to other forms of protected speech,
such as a recipe requiring an oven).
75. See id. at 449 (concluding that code qualifies as speech while still recognizing
a code’s functional purpose).
76. See id. at 448 (concluding that just as instructions are First Amendment speech
because of their ability to convey information, computer code should also qualify as
speech because it too conveys information by instructing a computer to perform tasks).
77. See id. at 449 (agreeing with other courts that computer code may merit First
Amendment protection while still acknowledging that the exact scope of protection is
yet to be determined).
78. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding
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often begins with the presumption that the restraint is unconstitutional.79
For example, In New York Times Company, two newspapers sought to
publish classified information on activities in Vietnam against the Nixon
administration’s argument that prior restraint was essential in protecting
national security.80
In its analysis, the Court weighed the central purpose of the First
Amendment in prohibiting governmental suppression of speech against the
government’s main interest in national security.81 In analyzing the First
Amendment speech interest against the government interest, the Court
found that the government did not overcome the heavy presumption against
prior restraint.82 Thus, even when a sufficient governmental interest
presumably exists, such as national security, courts must weigh this interest
against the speech interest as it relates to the First Amendment.83
4. ITAR and the First Amendment
The State Department’s request to remove the CAD files from the
Internet for possible violations of the ITAR did not present a novel
constitutional question because others have previously challenged the
ITAR’s constitutionality on First Amendment grounds.84 Specifically, in
Bernstein v. U.S. Department of State, the State Department partially
restrained a graduate student who sought to publish an encryption
algorithm he developed.85 In this case, the plaintiffs argued that the
that the government did not meet this heavy burden when seeking to enjoin the
newspapers from publishing portions of a study on the Vietnam war).
79. See id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining the heavy presumption
against a prior restraint’s constitutional validity because of the First Amendment’s chief
purpose in preventing prior restraints).
80. See generally id. (majority opinion) (holding that the government did not
meetthe requisite burden of proof to justify preventing the publication of a classified
Defense Department study).
81. See id. at 719-20 (Black, J., concurring) (balancing the interests to determine
whether the Government met its burden as required in prior restraint cases).
82. See id. at 724 (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that the vague use of the word
“security” should not undermine the First Amendment’s goal of prohibiting the
suppression of information).
83. See id. at 730 (Brennan, J., concurring) (concluding that the speech interest
outweighed the government’s interest because disclosing the information would not
“surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its
people”).
84. See William A. Hodkowski, Comment, The Future of Internet Security: How
New Technologies Will Shape the Internet and Affect the Law, 13 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGHT TECH. L.J. 217, 240-41 (1997) (noting that cases have tested the
boundaries of the ITAR, specifically attacking its licensing requirements).
85. See generally Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal.
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licensing scheme under the ITAR imposed an unconstitutional prior
restraint on the cryptographic speech.86
A California district court acknowledged both the purpose of the ITAR
as controlling the dissemination of defense-related commodities abroad, as
well as the First Amendment’s application to code as speech.87 However,
the court also recognized that regulation in the interest of national security
does not alone justify prior restraint.88 Thus, the court held that there was a
prior restraint on speech that violated the First Amendment.89 Although it
remains unlikely that courts will entirely eliminate export controls on
encryption technology, subsequent lawsuits may continue to loosen
government regulations.90
III. ANALYSIS
The framers of the First Amendment neither could fathom the
technological innovations of today’s world nor foresee the intricate legal
questions that would result.91 Just as the introduction of prior inventions
such as film and television presented novel First Amendment issues for
courts to tackle, the world’s first 3-d printed gun presents similarly unique
and complex issues.92 Perhaps some of the more challenging questions
regarding new technological advancements and the law focus not on
whether a power to regulate exists, but on whether the regulation fits within
the contours of the First Amendment.93 As discussed above, this
1996) (arguing that licensing requirements under the ITAR are unconstitutional).
86. See id. at 1285 (noting the immediate and irreversible sanction prior restraints
place on speech).
87. See id. at 1287 (recognizing First Amendment arguments against the licensing
scheme).
88. See id. at 1288 (expressing concern over the uncertainty regarding what types
of speech are subject to ITAR regulation).
89. See id. at 1290 (concluding that the ITAR licensing scheme of cryptographic
software operates as an unconstitutional prior restraint because it fails to impose a time
limit on the licensing decision which may prevent a prompt judicial review).
90. See Hodkowski, supra note 84, at 242 (noting that while courts are hesitant to
question the Executive on national security issues, these cases may still bear some
significance).
91. See Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 434 (2d Cir. 2001)
(recognizing that the framers of the First Amendment did not draft it with today’s
digital world in mind).
92. See id. (explaining past significant First Amendment issues raised by new
inventions and the more modern issues involving various aspects of computer
technology).
93. See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1303 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
aff’d sub nom. Bernstein v. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), reh’g
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determination will first turn on whether a CAD file qualifies as speech
despite its functionality.94 If defined as speech, the speech’s particular
characterization will dictate the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny that
laws regulating a CAD file should receive, ultimately determining whether
regulating a CAD file violates the First Amendment.95
A. A CAD File Should be Classified as Speech Under the First Amendment
Because Although It Does Not Qualify as Pure Speech, It Contains
Sufficient Elements of Communication.
Although expressive, a CAD file moves beyond a pure speech
categorization because it relies on modern-day aspects of functionality.96
In fact, a CAD file is both expressive for its more traditional aspects of
speech, the file’s blueprint design, and functional for its ability to instruct a
printer to create a real, 3-d object from an online design.97 The CAD file’s
functionality depends on the existence of an expressive blueprint design
and, therefore, the file contains sufficient elements of communication to
classify the file as a type of speech that warrants a First Amendment
analysis.98
1. The Blueprint of the 3-d Printable Gun Incorporates New Technology,
Creating a Modern Blueprint That No Longer Qualifies as Pure Speech
Under the First Amendment.
Courts generally accept blueprints with instructional value as pure
speech, meaning speech that lacks a non-speech component.99 However,
granted, withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999) (asserting that the lack of a clear
line between communication and its consequences created the issue).
94. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 451 (analyzing whether a computer code’s
functionality rids it of its expressive value).
95. See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010)
(distinguishing amongst pure speech, non-pure speech containing sufficient speech
elements, and non-pure speech not containing sufficient speech elements).
96. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 447 (asserting that computer programs are not
exempted from the category of First Amendment speech merely because they require
the use of a computer).
97. See id. at 448 (concluding that instructions communicating information qualify
as speech regardless of whether the instructions are designed for execution by a human,
a computer, or both).
98. See id. at 451 (requiring a First Amendment analysis for code that combines
non-speech and speech elements).
99. See id. (stating examples of pure speech, such as blueprints designed to instruct
engineers and recipes designed to instruct cooks); see also Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1062
(concluding that the process of tattooing is akin to writing down words or drawing a
picture and so, the process and the tattoo are pure speech).
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courts classifying blueprints as pure speech premise this categorization on
the assumption that it is impossible to yield any functional result without
the participation and interpretation of a live human being.100In today’s
world, modern technology does not necessitate the same level of human
involvement in the comprehension of a blueprint, sometimes requiring as
little as the single click of a mouse to achieve functional results.101 Indeed,
functional capability cannot be realized without at least a “momentary
intercession of human action.”102 Although this lack of, or minimal, human
involvement does not rid the speech of its expressive value, it nonetheless
pushes this modern blueprint beyond the pure speech category.103
2. Accordingly, the CAD File of the Blueprint for the 3-d Printable Gun
Should be Characterized as Expressive Conduct Because It Combines
Expressive and Functional Conduct.
A CAD file encompasses a novel area of speech, combining both nonspeech and speech elements.104 Courts evaluating the First Amendment’s
applicability to software most recently navigated through this nontraditional First Amendment analysis.105 Specifically, a CAD file is both
expressive in its ability to convey a plethora of complex ideas and
functional for its critical role in the performance of certain tasks, including
the production of 3-d digital models such as the recently printed functional
3-d gun.106

100. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 451 (explaining that a blueprint or recipe requires not
only human comprehension of the instructions or design, but also human thought and
action).
101. See id. (emphasizing that computer code can instantly cause a computer to
accomplish tasks and produce intended results).
102. See id. (acknowledging that for code to achieve its intended results, a human
must at least, for example, consciously decide to insert the disk containing the code into
the computer).
103. See id. (asserting that the differences in new types of media justify a different
First Amendment application).
104. See id. (arguing that code requires a First Amendment analysis that combines
the function-expression dichotomy).
105. See id. (emphasizing that the realities of what code is and what it is designed to
do justify a First Amendment analysis that treats code as combining non-speech and
speech elements).
106. See id. (explaining how source code is an example of the changes new
technology brings, particularly for its ability to embody both highly expressive and
functional attributes).
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Specifically, a CAD File Is a Type of Expressive Conduct
Becauseof Its Ability to Integrate Design and Manufacturing by
Creating Printable Electronic Blueprints That Bring to Life a
Designer’s Information and Ideas.

A CAD file moves a step beyond the traditionally recognized forms of
speech protected under the First Amendment such as a painting by Jackson
Pollock or the Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.107 Nonetheless, a CAD
file and the printable blueprint it contains also communicate information
and ideas.108 Although an average computer user may not fully understand
the mechanisms behind how a CAD program assists in the design and
creation of a CAD file containing a 3-d printable blueprint, unintelligibility
does not void the file of its expressive features. 109
Further, courts recognize expressive activities that combine elements of
speech and conduct as speech for First Amendment purposes.110 In Oakes,
the Massachusetts court held that the photographing of a semi-nude female
minor constituted expressive conduct because the posing and
photographing of the minor combined elements of both speech and
conduct.111 Specifically, in Oakes, the combination of a traditionally
recognized form of speech, photography, with conduct, the posing of a
nude minor, became the determining factor that the defendant engaged in
an expressive activity.112 Likewise, a CAD file also combines a
traditionally recognized form of speech, instructional blueprints, with the
more functional aspects of printing; therefore, a CAD file also qualifies as

107. See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2000) (recognizing the
versatile scope of the First Amendment by identifying untraditional forms of protected
speech).
108. See id. (implying that speech does not require universal comprehension, for
example, a musical score qualifies as First Amendment speech even though it can only
be fully interpreted and understood by fellow musicians).
109. See id. at 485 (concluding that computer source code qualifies as speech
because it exchanges information and ideas).
110. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Grp. Of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995)
(classifying parades as an expressive activity); see also United States v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (classifying the burning of certificates as an expressive activity);
Commonwealth v. Oakes, 551 N.E.2d 910, 912 (Mass. 1990) (classifying
photographing as an expressive activity).
111. See Oakes, 551 N.E.2d at 912 (distinguishing the posing and photographing of
the minor as mixed speech from the dissemination of such photographs, which would
be pure speech).
112. See id. at 913 (establishing that the posing of the minor and subsequent
photographing was not pure speech but expressive conduct because it mixed elements
of speech and conduct).
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expressive.113
Further, because a CAD file does not automatically convey a message on
its face as pure speech does, it becomes necessary to engage in an analysis
of whether sufficient elements of communication exist to bring the First
Amendment into play.114 Accordingly, because a CAD file does not
outwardly convey a message, a court must discern the presence of any
potential expressive elements.115 For example, in Spence, the Supreme
Court analyzed whether sufficient communicative elements existed before
holding that displaying a United States flag upside-down with a peace
symbol qualifies as speech and therefore falls within the contours of the
First Amendment.116 Likewise, a CAD file contains sufficient elements of
communication to justify a First Amendment analysis, specifically, because
a CAD file enables a designer to convey his or her ideas and information
through a CAD design.117
b. Courts Should Classify a CAD File as Functional Because the File
Essentially Exists For Its Ability to Instruct a 3-d Printer.
The functionality of a CAD file stems from its existence and purpose in
translating an electronic 3-d model into a printable, functional object.118 In
Name.Space, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that domain names served the functional purpose of directing traffic
through the Internet.119 Likewise, a CAD file, created for its ability to
113. See id. (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the photography qualified as
pure speech because the posing and photographing of the minor combined conduct with
speech).
114. See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010)
(explaining that because some activities do not clearly convey a message, courts must
engage in a further interpretive step to determine the presence of expressiveness).
115. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (reasoning that it was
necessary to determine whether the appellant’s activity contained sufficient elements of
communication to fall within the scope of the First Amendment because the appellant
articulated his view not through words but by using a flag).
116. See id. at 415 (concluding that because the flag sent a direct message aimed at
promoting peace over war it deserved protection as speech under the First
Amendment).
117. See id. (explaining that when determining whether sufficient speech elements
exist, the court should consider the conduct’s context to decide whether it conveyed
information or ideas).
118. See Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 164 (3d Cir.
2002) (explaining that a functional object or activity serves a purely functional, as
opposed to expressive, purpose).
119. See Name.Space v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 587 (2d Cir. 2000)
(recognizing a wholly functional activity for its purpose in carrying out tasks and its
lack of expressiveness).
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design printable blueprints, rather than simply for discussion, serves a
similar functional purpose in directing a printer on how to successfully
print an electronic 3-d model.120 However, a CAD file cannot be classified
exclusively for its functional features because its functionality entirely
depends on the design and creation of an expressive 3-d blueprint.121 In
fact, the CAD file’s chief functional purpose in translating the 3-d blueprint
into a printable object relies on the existence of this detailed blueprint.122
Whereas a CAD file depends on an expressive blueprint, the domain names
analyzed in Name.Space and the eruv analyzed in Tenafly do not depend on
such an expressive element of speech; thus, the court only recognized their
functionality in holding that the First Amendment did not apply.123
3. A CAD File Combining Expressive and Functional Conduct Still
Qualifies as Speech Under the First Amendment Because Sufficient
Elements of Communication Exist.
Indeed, a CAD file exhibits expressive features and contains sufficient
communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play.124
However, a CAD file’s functional features serve an arguably greater
purpose and so these functional elements should be viewed as distinct from
a CAD file’s speech elements.125 Nonetheless, other courts have viewed
this type of combination as purely expressive speech, for example, in the
case of tattooing, because of the functionality’s inextricable intertwinement
with the purely expressive end product, a tattoo.126 In Anderson, the court
distinguished between the tattooing process and the tattoo itself before
120. See id. at 577 (classifying the directing of traffic through the Internet as
functional).
121. See Draeger, Future Tech, supra note 3 (asserting that a CAD file uses a 3-d
digital blueprint to instruct the 3-d printer on how to construct that object).
122. See Name.Space, 202 F.3d at 585 (explaining that domain names do not
qualify as speech under the First Amendment because they embody only non-speech,
functional elements).
123. See id. (asserting that domain names are not speech because their generic,
three-letter combinations lack expressiveness); see also Tenafly, 309 F.3d at 164
(classifying the building of an eruv as functional for its purpose in acting as a
boundary).
124. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (recognizing expressive
conduct with sufficient elements of speech as First Amendment speech).
125. See Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 451 (2d Cir. 2001)
(asserting that the functionality of a computer code properly affects the scope of its
First Amendment protection).
126. See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the tattoo, the process of tattooing, and the business of tattooing are all
forms of pure expression fully protected by the First Amendment).
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holding that both a tattooist and the person receiving the tattoo equally
contribute to the creative process.127 This conclusion is not uncommon, as
traditional processes of expression through a medium have never been so
distinct from the expression itself to justify a separate analysis of the
functional and expressive attributes.128 However, in today’s modern world,
processes are no longer always intertwined with this type of expression
because modern technology carries the potential for anyone to navigate
through a process without ever actually contributing to the overall
expressiveness.129 Specifically, unlike tattooing, printing a blueprint from a
CAD file does not require one to actually design the blueprint or otherwise
engage in an expressive process.130 Therefore, although the functional
elements do not entirely void the CAD file of its expressiveness, courts
must recognize the CAD file for its distinct expressiveness and
functionality.131
Under a traditional First Amendment analysis, courts would likely define
a blueprint that does not require the use of technology as pure speech.132
However, the introduction of technology and the Internet allows for the
potential combination of traditional elements of First Amendment speech,
such as those found in pure speech with more functional attributes
requiring minimal human activity.133 For example, the CAD file blends
aspects of modern functional technology with the traditional blueprint, a
combination that enables the average computer user to access a gun simply
by downloading the file and clicking print.134
127. See id. at 1062 (reasoning that the tattoo process is entitled to the same First
Amendment protection as the tattoo because the process is also expressive and directly
relates to the purely expressive end-product).
128. See id. (acknowledging that courts have never questioned the First
Amendment’s applicability to processes involved in creating speech, including writing
words on a paper, painting a picture, and playing an instrument).
129. But see id. (explaining that both the tattooist and the person receiving the tattoo
engage in expressive conduct to bring about the pure speech element, in this case, the
tattoo).
130. See Jensen-Haxel, 3D Printers, supra note 18, at 452 (noting that 3-d printers
allow users to download free 3-d models to print from their computers without
participating in the design process).
131. But see Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1062 (finding that tattooing is pure speech
because a tattoo artist undoubtedly contributes to the overall creative process).
132. See Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 451 (2d Cir. 2001)
(classifying blueprints as pure speech because of their instructional value and the
human involvement required to interpret and understand the blueprint).
133. See id. (asserting that differences in new media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them).
134. But see id. (reasoning that traditional blueprints and recipes deserve more First
Amendment protection because they require human interaction and comprehension to
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Notably, in Corley, the court faced this 21st century combination of
expression and functionality when analyzing computer code and found that
the presence of the functional features did not abrogate the code’s
expressive value.135 Similarly, although a CAD file also exhibits both
expressive and functional features, it nonetheless contains sufficient
elements of speech to trigger First Amendment protection.136 The
distinctive nature of this type of speech, specifically pertaining to both the
expressiveness and functionality of the CAD file and the presence of
sufficient communicative elements, draws parallels to the similar
characteristics found in computer code and software, thus prompting a
comparable analysis under the First Amendment.137
B. Because a CAD File Contains Both Speech and Non-Speech Elements,
the Appropriate Test For Whether Restrictions on the CAD File Violate the
First Amendment Should be Whether a Sufficiently Important Government
Interest Exists in Regulating the Non- Speech Elements.
Generally, the government has more liberty to restrict expressive
conduct, meaning conduct combining non-speech and speech elements,
than it does in restricting pure speech.138 Nonetheless, courts will consider
the context and the government’s interest when analyzing potential speech
elements and the applicability of the First Amendment.139 Specifically, a
court should consider the individual characteristics of a speech’s
functionality when weighing the government’s interest in regulation.140

transform the drawing or words into a real object or meal).
135. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 451 (recognizing that computer code may be
expressive, but that it also has a functional, non-speech aspect because of its ability to
allow recipients to circumvent an encryption system).
136. See id. (concluding that a First Amendment analysis is justified because
computer code is a type of speech despite the presence of its functional characteristics).
137. See id. (calling for a different application of the First Amendment for new
media).
138. See Commonwealth v. Oakes, 551 N.E.2d 910, 912 (Mass. 1990) (asserting
that the First Amendment protects the traditional written or spoken word more than it
protects other speech).
139. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (finding that the
presence of expressive elements does not necessarily prohibit regulation under the First
Amendment).
140. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 451 (explaining the importance of the decryption
code’s functionality in concluding that minimal human involvement should neither
diminish the non-speech component of code nor classify it as a type of pure speech).
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1. The Functionality of the CAD File for the 3-d Gun Blueprint Should
Limit the First Amendment’s Reach Despite the File’s Expressiveness.
The Corley court argued that functionality should limit the scope of the
First Amendment because of potential consequences resulting from the
functional features, especially given the unique capabilities of the
Internet.141 In this respect, functionality stands as a “proxy for effects or
harm” because the limitless reach of the Internet makes it only rational to
assume that the decryption program’s publication on the Internet will
inevitably lead to the program’s use.142 Likewise, if made available online,
one would also rationally assume that Internet users will download the
CAD file containing the 3-d gun blueprint with the intention of actually
printing a gun.143
The potential for a substantial risk of imminent harm created by the
worldwide dissemination on the Internet of files containing blueprints for
printable, workable guns is real.144 Particularly, components of a gun
typically requiring a license to purchase may now be printed in the privacy
of one’s own home, license-free.145 This justifies a consideration of the
impact and potential for harm stemming from the file’s functional features
when determining the regulation’s constitutionality.146 Therefore, because
the file’s functionality remains distinct from its expressive elements, courts
should apply intermediate scrutiny instead of strict scrutiny when analyzing

141. See id. (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d
294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)(explaining that society depends upon technological means of
controlling access to digital files and systems because of the potential far-reaching
implications if left uncontrolled).
142. See id. at 452 (asserting that Internet users who access the decryption program
will use it for the program’s ability to bypass an access control system, a system
designed to control access to a network by, for example, limiting a user’s ability to use
certain resources on a computer system).
143. See Ferguson, Boon for Criminals, supra note 4 (cautioning that criminals who
cannot legally access guns are more likely to use 3-d gun blueprints than are lawabiding homeowners).
144. See Navneet Alang, 3-D Printed Guns and the End of the Internet’s Wild West,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL (May 8, 2013, 7:00 AM), available at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/digital-culture/3-d-printed-guns-and-theend-of-the-internets-wild-west/article11754916/(recognizing the implications of the 3-d
gun and the increasingly accessible 3-d printer).
145. See Draeger, Future Tech, supra note 3, (cautioning that 3-d printers utilizing
metals or polymers can privately print out the necessary parts for a functional,
unregistered gun).
146. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 452 (arguing that the link between the dissemination of
harmful code and its improper use justifies selecting a level of scrutiny based on its
functionality).
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the constitutionality of restrictions on CAD files.147
C. A Restriction on a CAD File Survives Intermediate Scrutiny and Does
Not Violate the First Amendment Because It Advances an Important
Government Interest Unrelated to the Suppression of Free Speech.
The restriction on a CAD file does not violate the First Amendment
because it survives intermediate scrutiny, the appropriate standard of
judicial review.148 Specifically, because a CAD file contains sufficient
elements of communication to bring it within the purview of the First
Amendment, the O’Brien test governs the constitutionality of the
restriction.149 As discussed below, a restriction on a CAD file containing a
3-d gun blueprint satisfies this test because it falls within the government’s
constitutional power, it furthers the important government interest of harm
regulation, it relates to the CAD file’s functionality, and it does not burden
substantially more speech than necessary to achieve its end goal.150
1. The CAD File’s Functional Capabilities Sparked the State Department’s
Request For Its Removal From the Internet, Thus Classifying the
Restriction as Content-Neutral.
When speech and non-speech elements are combined, as in a CAD file,
government regulation may be constitutional if the government’s interest
relates to the regulation of the non-speech elements.151 Specifically, the
scope of protection for speech under the First Amendment hinges on
whether the restriction targets the content of the speech.152 For example, in
147. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (using intermediate
scrutiny without specifically labeling the level of scrutiny because the burning of the
registration certificate combined speech and non-speech elements); see also Corley,
273 F.3d at 456 (applying O’Brien’s intermediate scrutiny).
148. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 454 (employing intermediate scrutiny for contentneutral regulation); see also O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382 (justifying the conviction through
the use of intermediate scrutiny).
149. See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010)
(asserting that the intermediate scrutiny test applies when sufficient speech elements
exist).
150. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (employing this four-part test when analyzing the
constitutionality of criminalizing the destruction of a Selective Service System
certificate).
151. See id. (explaining that government regulation is sufficiently justified if,
among other reasons, the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression); see also Corley, 272 F.3d at 451 (remarking that this approach applies
whether the regulation targets expression, conduct, or any activity combining both nonspeech and speech elements).
152. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 450, 454 (asserting that the court must first decide
whether the restriction classifies as content- based or content-neutral, a classification
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Corley, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court’s decision enjoining the appellants from posting a
decryption system, designed to circumvent the encryption technology on
DVDs, on their website by holding that the restriction targeted only the
non-speech component relating to its ability to instruct a computer to
decrypt an encryption system.153
As in Corley, where the targeting of the code’s functional capabilities
defined the restriction as content-neutral, the restriction of the CAD file
does not target the blueprint; rather, it targets the file’s functionality, or its
ability to communicate to the printer how to create the blueprint into a real,
functional product.154 Similarly, a restriction on the CAD file does not
target the blueprint’s expressive qualities, but applies because of the file’s
purpose and capability in directing the 3-d printer, with the single click of a
mouse, to print a workable and untraceable gun.155 The controlling
consideration becomes the government’s purpose in restricting the
dissemination of a CAD file on the Internet for its potential to enable
anyone in the world to arm themselves with the click of a button.156
Indeed, the restriction might have an incidental effect on some speech
elements; however, the regulation targets the file’s functional capacity, and,
therefore, it becomes a content-neutral regulation.157
Specifically, the State Department’s letter targets the CAD file because
the State Department believes that the file qualifies as ITAR-controlled
technical data.158 The ITAR regulates technical data because of its
paramount role in producing defense articles.159 The CAD file transforms
that will determine the applicable level of scrutiny that courts will employ).
153. See id. (reasoning that the code’s targeted functional capability does not
qualify as speech under the First Amendment).
154. See id. (observing that the code’s ability to convey information created the
First Amendment speech component).
155. See id. at 454 (contending that restricting the code’s publication relates to its
capacity to instruct a computer to decrypt the encryption used to prevent DVD data
from being copied, which is a functional or non-speech characteristic).
156. See id. at 450 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989) (finding that a regulation unrelated to the speech elements is neutral even if it
has “an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others”).
157. See id. at 450 (reasoning that government regulation of expressive activity is
content neutral if the government’s interest does not relate to the content of regulated
speech).
158. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Letter, supra note 28 (explaining that the ITAR
imposes certain requirements on the transfer of, and access to, controlled defense
articles and related technical data).
159. See id. (asserting that ITAR-regulated data includes information required to
design or produce defense articles).
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an expressive blueprint into this type of technical data because of the file’s
functional purpose in producing a defense article, a workable gun.160 The
targeting of this functionality justifies the conclusion that the regulation
should be classified as content-neutral.161
2. The Regulation Furthers a Substantial Government Interest Unrelated to
the File’s Speech Elements.
To survive intermediate scrutiny, the regulation or restriction must
further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of free speech.162 In O’Brien, the Court held that the
government’s interest in ensuring the successful functioning of the
Selective Service System related to the non-communicative aspects of
O’Brien’s conduct.163 Further, the Court reasoned that O’Brien frustrated
the governmental interest by impeding the functioning of the system
established by Congress to raise armies.164 Likewise, restricting the CAD
file furthers a substantial government interest in harm regulation that relates
not to the expressiveness of the CAD file, but to its functionality,
particularly regarding its ability to instruct a 3-d printer to print a functional
gun.165
In Corley, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
similarly found an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated
to the suppression of free expression.166 Specifically, the court decided that
the restriction furthered a substantial governmental interest related to the
functional capacity of the code’s ability to instruct a computer to
decrypt.167A restriction on the CAD file correspondingly serves a
160. See id. (specifying that technical data includes information in the form of
blueprints, drawings, etc.).
161. See Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 442 (2d Cir. 2001)
(summarizing the defendants’ arguments on the classification of computer code and the
resulting level of scrutiny courts should employ when evaluating the restriction).
162. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968) (examining the
governmental interest in preventing the burning of Selective Service certificates).
163. See id. (examining the Amendment prohibiting the destruction or mutilation of
Selective Service registration certificates).
164. See id. (explaining that the nation has a vital interest in maintaining a system
for raising armies; therefore, the government has a substantial interest in assuring the
availability of Selective Service certificates).
165. See id. at 382 (distinguishing the regulation from one directly aimed at
suppressing communication).
166. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 454 (stating that the government’s interest in
preventing unauthorized access to encrypted copyrighted material is unquestionably
substantial).
167. See id. (explaining that regulating the decryption code relates to the
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comparable governmental interest in national security based again on the
file’s functional capacity to instruct a 3-d printer.168
3. Regulating a CAD File Containing a 3-d Gun Blueprint For Violating
the ITAR Meets the Narrowly Tailored Requirement Under Intermediate
Scrutiny Because the Means Are Not Substantially Broader than Necessary
to Fulfill the Government’s Interest.
Finally, under the O’Brien test, the restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms must not be greater than necessary to further the
government interest.169 For example, the O’Brien Court agreed that the
government chose the most narrowly tailored, or least restrictive, means to
achieve its important objective in preventing the destruction of Selective
Service certificates.170 Likewise, although not as evident as in O’Brien, the
Corley court held that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act also achieved
a narrowly tailored means in preventing the circumvention of digital walls
guarding copyrighted materials.171
In this analysis, the court in Corley recognized other ways for the
government to accomplish this goal but argued that a content-neutral
restriction need not employ the least restrictive means.172 Instead, the
restriction need only avoid burdening substantially more speech than
necessary to achieve a legitimate interest.173 Similarly, although other
means may also superficially help deter criminals from printing a 3-d gun,
such as criminal and civil liability, the content-neutral restriction on the
CAD file does not require the most narrowly tailored means available to
government’s interest in preventing unauthorized access regardless of whether the code
contains any information that would qualify as speech).
168. See id. at 453 (asserting that the decryption program’s ability to accomplish
unauthorized and unlawful access to materials in which plaintiffs have intellectual
property rights limits the program’s First Amendment protection).
169. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (requiring the
incidental restriction to be no greater than essential to further the interest).
170. See id. at 381 (suggesting that there are no alternative means more accurately
and narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s interest in ensuring the continuing
availability of Selective Service certificates than a law directly prohibiting their
destruction).
171. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 454 (noting that the appellants failed to suggest any
other technique to prevent the instantaneous worldwide distribution of a decryption
code that would make a lesser restriction on the code’s speech elements).
172. See id. at 450 (explaining that a content-based restriction must employ the least
restrictive means to reach its goal, but that a content-neutral restriction must only not
burden substantially more speech than necessary).
173. See id. at 455 (suggesting other possible ways to accomplish the same goal,
such as by creating criminal and civil liability for those who gain unauthorized access).
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achieve its goal.174 A restriction limited to the specific CAD file containing
the 3-d gun blueprint rather than a restriction on all CAD files, the CAD
program, or the 3-d printer, satisfies the standard employed by the court in
Corley because it does not burden substantially more speech than
necessary.175
D. Even if a Court Views a Restriction on a CAD File as a Prior Restraint,
the Regulation Will Nevertheless Withstand Constitutional Scrutiny
Because the Government’s Interest in Regulating the File Outweighs Any
Potential First Amendment Speech Interests.
Although regulating a CAD file satisfies the test for intermediate
scrutiny, some may view a restriction on a CAD file as a prior restraint on
the file’s speech elements.176 In particular, some may apply this
classification because a restriction on the CAD file would inevitably also
prevent the publication of the accompanying 3-d gun blueprint.177 Thus, if
a court classifies the State Department’s action as a prior restraint, it must
engage in an analysis focusing on the balancing of the alleged speech
interests as it relates to the First Amendment against the government’s
interest in suppression.178
Unlike in New York Times Company, the restriction of a CAD file does
not involve the press; therefore, this restriction does not require an analysis
focusing on the traditional importance of a free press.179 Specifically, in his
concurrence in New York Times Company, Justice Douglas noted that the
prior restraint on the newspapers would undermine the dominant purpose of
the First Amendment in prohibiting the widespread practice of

174. See id. (recognizing the argument that the restriction may not be absolutely
necessary to prevent unauthorized access because other ways exist that may also
accomplish the goal).
175. See id. (concluding that although the prohibition on the posting of the
decryption code is not the least restrictive way to prevent access, it is nonetheless
narrowly tailored).
176. See generally Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (arguing that the ITAR’s licensing requirements are an unconstitutional prior
restraint on the plaintiff’s ability to communicate and publish both his speech code and
its accompanying technical data).
177. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (striking
down a prior restraint on speech by allowing the New York Times to publish internal
Pentagon documents).
178. See id. at 717 (Black, J. concurring) (considering the First Amendment’s
purpose as it applies to the alleged infringement on free speech).
179. See id. (explaining the importance of free press, for example, its ability to
expose government deception).
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governmental suppression of embarrassing information.180 Unlike the prior
restraint in New York Times Company, a restriction on CAD files focuses
on dangers stemming from the file’s functional capacity and thus, it would
not undermine a core purpose of the First Amendment.181 In fact, refusing
to regulate the CAD file would likely result in irreparable damage, a danger
Justice Brennan argued would not result from the publication of the
Pentagon Papers in New York Times Company.182 More importantly, the
restriction on CAD files would not likely constitute a prior restraint
because the government took action only after Mr. Wilson made the CAD
file available online.183 However, even if the CAD file restriction
constitutes a prior restraint, the government’s national security interest in
regulating the export of defense items under the ITAR would remain
justified when weighed against the First Amendment.184
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Regardless of whether government regulation of CAD files containing 3d gun blueprints under the ITAR is constitutionally justified, the significant
and immediate threat to public safety posed by the new 3-d printed gun
represents the pressing need to address this issue before technology
outpaces the law.185 Three-dimensional printers traditionally created the
least threatening of objects.186 However, the recent firing of a 3-d printed
gun illustrates the emerging capabilities and dangers stemming from this
new technology.187 When contemplating these dangers and considering
180. See id. at 723-24 (Douglas, J. concurring) (asserting that the present case
would “go down in history as the most dramatic illustration of that principle”).
181. See id. at 720 (interpreting one of the core purposes of the First Amendment as
preventing governmental restraint on the press).
182. See id. at 730 (Brennan, J. concurring) (concluding that the publication would
not surely result in irreparable damage).
183. See Chandler, How to Regulate, supra note 23 (noting that over 100,000
people downloaded the CAD file before its removal).
184. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718 (1971) (arguing
that the prior restraint case did not ask the court to construe specific regulations or
apply specific laws, but rather it simply sought to prevent the publication of material).
185. See Gayle S. Putrich, Plastic Gun Draws Eyes to 3-D Printing, PLASTICS NEWS
(May
13,
2013,
2:30
PM),
available
at
http://www.plasticsnews.com/article/20130510/NEWS/130519989/plas tic-gun-drawseyes-to-3-d-printing# (remarking that digital technology will fast outpace the law
because it carries the potential to make manufacturing more affordable and accessible).
186. See Jensen-Haxel, supra note 18, at 450 (listing examples of 3-d printed
objects, such as hearing aids and violins).
187. See Navneet Alang, 3-D Printed Guns and the End of the Internet’s Wild West,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL (May 8, 2013, 7:00 AM), available at
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potential ways to regulate this modern-day weapon, it remains important to
consider the significant economic and social benefits in an effort to avoid
impeding future beneficial innovations.188 Nevertheless, legally controlling
technology should become a top priority as digital technology begins to
move beyond what it once stood for: mere convenience and individual
empowerment.189 However, legislation banning the use of new technology,
particularly 3-d printers, will undoubtedly spark strong opposition because
such a sweeping and general ban on 3-d printers would significantly hinder
innovation and growth.190
Instead, one option at lawmakers’ disposal includescriminalizing certain
uses of technology.191 Yet another option would require all 3-d printers to
connect with the Internet to function, establishing a procedure that would
force users to check with a list of prohibited items online before allowing
them to download and print blueprints.192 Others suggest that addressing
the most basic part of the firearm, the energy source, would best regulate
the 3-d printed gun, especially given that 3-d printed guns and other plastic
firearms will increasingly become difficult to detect using traditional
screening techniques.193
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/digital-culture/3-d- printed-guns-and-theend-of-the-internets-wild-west/ article11754916/ (warning that the 3-d printer is now
advanced enough to create a deadly firearm).
188. See id. (mandating that it remains critical for the government to avoid
overreacting to this new technology).
189. See id. (arguing that all new technology must eventually be subjected to some
restraint, for example, the printing press created copyright and comprehensive libel
laws to address the printing press’s unprecedented ability to convey information).
190. See Heather Kelly, Study: At-home 3-d Printing Could Save Consumers
‘Thousands,’
CNN
(July
31,
2013,
12:06
PM),
available
at
http://whatsnext.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/31/study-at-home-3-dprinting-could-saveconsumers-thousands/ (asserting that 3-d printers can not only save consumers money,
but can also benefit the environment by reducing packaging and transportation).
191. See Alang, supra note 187 (suggesting criminalization as one way to balance
liberty with safety and privacy concerns).
192. See Opinion, Their View: 3-D Printed Gun You Read About Is Just the Start,
LAS CRUCES SUN-NEWS (May 21, 2013, 1:00 AM), available at http://www.lcsunnews.com/las_cruces-opinion/ci_23284394/theirview-3-d-printed-gun-you-read
(explaining Professor Zittrain’s proposal while acknowledging his doubts about his
suggestion).
193. See Making Homemade Guns on a 3-D Printer Becomes Real, so Engineering
Expert Suggests Stronger Laws on Gunpowder, STATES NEWS SERVICE (Feb. 12, 2013,
3:45 PM), available at http://www.newswise.com/articles/making-homemade-guns-ona-3-dprinter-becomes-real-so-engineering-expert-suggests-strongerlaws-ongunpowder (explaining Professor Lipson’s suggestion that legal limitations on
gunpowder could successfully regulate 3-d guns because to fire a bullet, gunpowder
remains crucial).
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This December, the Senate voted in favor of renewing the Undetectable
Firearms Act of 1988, which makes manufacturing undetectable guns a
federal offense.194 After the House of Representatives voted in favor of
renewing the bill, Senator Chuck Schumer from New York sought to
modify it.195 Specifically, Senator Schumer voiced concerns because the
bill only requires manufacturers to include a single metal piece on the gun
to ensure detection by metal detectors.196 Defense Distributed’s 3-d printed
gun complies with this requirement as it contains one metal piece – a
standard carpenter’s nail used as the firing pin; however, this piece may
easily be removed to circumvent a metal detector.197 Despite these
concerns, the Senate ultimately passed the bill unmodified, leaving a
potential loophole in the law.198
The 3-d printed gun’s first shot provides a small glimpse into the “dark
side” of 3-d printing technology.199 The peril posed by 3-d printed guns
will only continue to grow as technology improves and 3-d printers become
more affordable.200 This mounting threat illustrates the need for Congress
to engage in a larger discussion focusing on the development of a
comprehensive public policy that reasonably and fairly regulates the
potential dangers associated with this new technology.201

194. See Colin Neagle, Explaining the Senate’s 3D-Printed Gun Ruling, NETWORK
WORLD
(Dec.
10,
2013,
11:09
AM),
available
at
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2013/121013-senate-3d-printed-gun-276778.html
(noting the Senate’s intention of preventing an increase in the production of 3-d printed
guns).
195. See id. (requesting a requirement mandating that plastic weapons include a
permanent piece of metal).
196. See id. (noting because no part of the law requires this metal piece to be
permanent that 3-d printed guns with removable metal pieces remain legal).
197. See id. (explaining that after re-attaching the removable metal piece, the gun
would become legal once again).
198. See id. (suggesting that this loophole remains despite the last-minute dispute
over the bill’s language).
199. See Jacob Silverman, A Gun, a Printer, an Ideology, THE NEW YORKER (May
7, 2013), available at http://www.newyorker.com/ online/blogs/elements/2013/05/3dprinted-gun-cody-wilson- defense-distributed.html (asserting that Mr. Wilson’s gun
epitomizes a dark side where individuals will be able to manufacture cheap and
untraceable weapons).
200. See id. (noting that the technology is moving from high-end commercial use to
personal use in the homes of thousands of hobbyists).
201. See Chandler, How to Regulate, supra note 23 (arguing the need to address the
issue even though the conversation may determine that the digital world is, in fact, far
too complex to regulate).
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V. CONCLUSION
After analyzing CAD files under the First Amendment, it becomes clear
that a CAD file contains both expressive and functional characteristics.202
Although a CAD file combines two traditionally distinct characteristics, its
functionality does not rid the file of its expressive features.203 As a result,
courts should classify a CAD file as expressive conduct, a classification
that dictates the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny as intermediate
scrutiny.204 The regulation of a CAD file will survive intermediate scrutiny
and not violate the First Amendment because the regulation furthers an
overall substantial interest in harm regulation by focusing not on the file’s
speech elements, but on the potential harm resulting from its
functionality.205

202. See Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 442 (2d Cir. 2001)
(recognizing computer code as expressive despite its functionality).
203. See id. at 448 (noting that computer code should qualify as speech because of
its ability to convey information).
204. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (employing
intermediate scrutiny for conduct combining elements of speech and conduct).
205. See id. at 377 (explaining that to survive intermediate scrutiny, the regulation
must further an important government interest in a way substantially related to the
interest).
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